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INTRODUCTION

For several years now, I have been working on a scholarly project that
sits at a somewhat (but not entirely) lonely intersection between Critical
Race Theory, contract law, and employment discrimination law, and that
has crossed paths with law and market economy theory.1 The project so
far has culminated in my proposal of a common law, good faith
2
antidiscrimination claim. Why, one might ask, in light of existing
federal and state statutory antidiscrimination remedies, is such a
common law claim needed? Because, as critical race scholars ("race
crits") have been arguing for the past two decades, conventional
antidiscrimination law is severely limited by its obsession - as a
structural and discursive matter - with intentionality as the linchpin of
the provable and successful discrimination claim.3 Thus, my good faith
claim aims principally to operationalize some recurring and

1 See Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Race Realism:
Re-Claiming the Antidiscrimination
Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 455 passim
(2005) [hereinafter Houh, Critical Race Realism] (theorizing common law antidiscrimination

claim, grounded doctrinally not in civil rights law, but in contractually implied obligation
of good faith, that incorporates contemporary re-conceptualizations of antidiscrimination
jurisprudence); Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality
Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025 passim (2003)
[hereinafter Houh, Critical Interventions] (employing critical race and law and market
economy theories to argue that using doctrine of good faith in contract law to prohibit
improper considerations of race in contracting is consistent not only with equitable
principles embodied by doctrines of implicit obligation, but also with contractual goals of
protecting parties' bargains, wealth formation, and facilitation of exchange transactions). A
word about Robin Paul Malloy's "law and market economy theory" may also be useful
here. Malloy has developed a semiotic model of market analysiS that emphasizes market
incentives and disincentives that focus on politics, community, and the culture(s) of market
actors, rather than on the maximization of a (Kaldor-Hicks) model of efficiency. See ROBIN
PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY: REINTERPRETING THE VALUES OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS (2000) [hereinafter MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY]; ROBIN PAUL
MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL
REASONING (2004) [hereinafter MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT].
2
See Houh, Critical Race Realism, supra note 1 passim.
3 See,
e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049
(1978) (arguing that traditional, then-existing antidiscrimination jurisprudence legitimized
racial discrimination because it developed from perpetrator, as opposed to victim
perspective and, in particular, be.:ause of its then narrowing emphasis on perpetrator
intent); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (questioning diSCriminatory intent
requirement for equal protection challenges set forth in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), and arguing that such requirement ignores more pervasive problem of unconscious
and unintentional racism).
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foundational insights of Critical Race Theory, such as the race crits'
critique of the intentionality requirement in conventional
antidiscrimination law. In terms of my work in this regard, the title of
this Symposium, of which I am so honored to be a part, inspires related
challenges and questions. For example, what does my good faith
antidiscrimination claim do for "the future" of Critical Race Feminism?
More specifically, does the claim have the potential to also operationalize
foundational tenets of Critical Race Feminism? Additionally, how might
the insights of critical race feminists ("fem crits") enable the further
development of my good faith claim?
This Essay begins to answer those questions. To provide background,
Part LA lays out the theoretical foundations of my proposed good faith
antidiscrimination claim, specifically describing Devon Carbado and
Mitu Gulati's influential "working identity" theory and its impact on my
ongoing project. Part LB then sets forth aspirations of my proposed
good faith claim, as well as for the future of Critical Race Feminism
("CRF") more generally, that call for more aggressive critical
engagement and "publicization" of private law. Part II describes the
elements of the good faith antidiscrimination claim itself, and explains
how the claim was developed to operationalize Carbado and Gulati's
working identity theory. Finally, Part TIl of this Essay begins to explore
the potential that my proposed claim may have for transferring the
related critical race feminist theories of anti-essentialism and
intersectionality into praxis, and, on the flipside, the implications those
theories may have for the further refinement and development of my
good faith claim. Specifically, Part lILA defines the foundational critical
race feminist concepts of anti-essentialism and intersectionality and
offers some responses to various critiques of those concepts. Part IILB
attempts to operationalize anti-essentialism and intersectionality vis-avis my proposed claim, specifically in a sexual harassment situation. In
this regard, Part TIl.B. employs a hypothetical and then applies my
proposed claim to that hypothetical, in order to demonstrate how the
claim might move CRF toward praxis.
1.

FOUNDATIONS AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE GOOD FAITH
ANTIDISCRIMINATION CLAIM

At the outset, my good faith project employs critical race and law and
market economy theories to make its primary normative argument. In
short, I argue that due to the inadequacies of statutory civil rights
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remedies, the contractual obligation of good faith should be used to
prohibit discriminatory conduct in the contractual context based on race,
gender, sexual identity, age, and/or other categories of identity.s With
respect to this project, I have also consistently and explicitly argued that
good faith doctrine should be used to assist in the elimination of
"discrimination," as that term has been defined by race crits, and,
similarly, to achieve a critical race conception of "equality." That is, my
project aims to contribute to the elimination of forms of discrimination
that are not only intentional and overt (which forms are largely
addressed by conventional statutory remedies), but also the more
pervasive and damaging forms of discrimination that are covert and
unintentional. In particular, my project aims (in part) to discard of
intentionality as the cornerstone of discrimination discourse. In this
regard, it also aims to shift antidiscrimination discourse away from that
jurisprudence's continuing move toward the wholesale adoption of an
overly narrow view of equality and an understanding of discrimination
as discrete sets of de-contextualized acts that are inflicted on a victim by
6
an individually motivated perpetrator who must intend to do harm.
A.

Carbado and Gulati's "Working Identity" Theory

I have begun to refine and further develop this project, both
theoretically and doctrinally, with the specific goal of formulating and
proposing an alternative antidiscrimination claim. This alternative claim
gets away from the discursive hurdle of intentionalism in conventional
antidiscrimination discourse. Further, it avoids the structural hurdle of
statutory burden-shifting frameworks that most often result in the failure
7
of plaintiffs' statutory claims. Theoretically, the project has focused
• It is well-established in American contract law that "[e]very contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONlRACTS § 205 (1981).
Additionally, the Vniform
Commercial Code ("V.c.c.") statutorily imposes a good faith and fair dealing obligation
into every contract falling within its scope, defining good faith as "honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." V.c.c. § 1-201(b)(20)
(amended 2003).
5 Houh, Critical Interventions, supra note 1 passim.
As a preliminary matter and for
practical purposes, my project limits application of this argument to employer-employee
contracts, although I believe there is potential for expansion into other contractual areas.
6
See Houh, Critical Interventions, supra note 1, at 1054-66, 1089-96.
7 For example, according to the well-known burden-shifting framework established
by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, a plaintiff who brings a disparate treatment, or
intentional discrimination, claim under Title VII must show that: she belongs to a
protected class traditionally discriminated against in the workplace; that she was
adequately qualified, but despite her qualifications, she received adverse treatment; and
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specifically on the recent critical race insights of Devon Carbado and
8
Mitu Gulati. Carbado and Gulati's interdisciplinary work has expanded
the discourse of antidiscrimination law by theorizing forms of workplace
discrimination based on the behavioral concepts of "performative" or
"working" identity and how those concepts negatively impact outsider
individuals (i.e., racial, gender, and sexual minorities) in the workplace.
That is, Carbado and Gulati argue that "the 'working identity'
phenomenon is a form of employment discrimination.,,9 Their theory of
"working identity" explores behavioral concepts of signaling and
identity performance in the employment context. They posit that
members of outsider groups in the workplace often must do extra
identity work because those outsiders correctly perceive themselves as
subject to negative stereotypes and expectations in the workplace to
1o
which majority employees are not subject.
As a result, members of
outsider groups in the workplace often feel compelled to perform and
signal loudly against negative identity-related stereotypes in order to
ll
prevent discrimination based on those stereotypes.
Identity work, according to Carbado and Gulati, burdens outsiders not
only in that this work requires them to do more on a physical, mental,
and emotional level, but also because it causes them to incur work and

that similarly situated, non-protected employees did not receive similar treatment.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.s. 792, 802 (1973). The employer-defendant may
then rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case simply by producing some legally sufficient
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse treatment. See Tex.
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981). If the employer-defendant
meets this burden, then the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the legitimate reasons offered by the employer are mere pretext. Id. at 255-56; McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
8
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder:
What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1646 (2004)
[hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top] (arguing that because of ways in which
institutional workplace incentives and workplace culture shape racial conduct and
performance, racial minorities who make it to "top" of corporate ladder may not be likely
to "lift as they climb"); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical
Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1765-66 (2003) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, The lAw and
Economics of CRT] (arguing that employment of "homogeneity incentive" in workplacewhereby employers develop institutional incentives around efficiency concerns that result
in racially homogeneous workplaces - gives rise to racial discrimination, and results
further in "mass-produc[tion] and clon[ingl" of racially palatable identities in workplace);
see also infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
9
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262
(2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity].
10
Id. at 1267-78; Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L.
REV. 103, 114-22 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Conversations at Work].
11
Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 9, at 1260-61.
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identity-related risks that their insider counterparts do not incur.12 Thus,
the shaping of workplace institutional incentives to perform or counterperform one's identity are at the heart of Carbado and Gulati's work.
They critique the existing law's failure to recognize this form of
discrimination and its failure to distinguish between discrimination
based on racial status and that based on racial conduct. In so doing,
Carbado and Gulati problematize the meaning of discrimination by
exposing the cultural, social, and psychological linkages between, for
example, a woman of color's racial conduct (which is continually
susceptible to a fixed set of negatively presumed outsider stereotypes, or
3
a fixed "image repertoire"/ and her racial status, to which that image
repertoire is attached in the first place. That a non-minority insider need
not negotiate his racial status by altering his conduct in the workplace,
that he need not do the extra identity work that an outsider is expected
to do, demonstrates just how normalized his culture and experiences in
the workplace are, and the extent to which workplaces can function as
materially and ideologically colonized and colonizing spaces.
Carbado and Gulati have effected a pathbreaking intervention in their
theorizing of working identity. Importantly, they have done so not only
within the parameters of existing antidiscrimination law by arguing that
12 [d. at 1279-84 (explaining hypothetically how black male criminal procedure
professor's pedagogical choices about teaching are impacted by his race and gender).
13 Feminist film theorist and post-colOnial scholar Trinh Minh-ha uses the term "image
repertoire," in the specific context of Third-World post-colonialism, to refer to a finite set of
representations that a dominant entity creates to "Orientalize" and dominate a subjugated
entity as "Other." Trinh writes:

This is the way the West carries the burden of the Other. Naming is part of the
human rituals of incorporation, and the unnamed remains less human than the
inhuman or sub-human.
The threatening Otherness must, therefore, be
transformed into figures that belong to a definite image-repertoire . . .. The
perception of the outsider as the one who needs help has taken on the successive
forms of the barbarian, the pagan, the infidel, the wild man, the "native," and the
underdeveloped.
TRINH T. MINH-HA, WOMAN NATIVE OTHER: WRfITNG POSTCOLONIALITY AND FEMINISM 54
(1989).
"Orientalism," first theorized by the late literary critic, cultural theorist, and postcolonial scholar Edward W. Said, refers to a specific discursive iteration of the Other as a
"Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient."
EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 3 (1978). Further, Orientalism names the "enormously
systematic diScipline by which European culture was able to manage, and even produce,
the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and
imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period," through European colonialism in
the Middle East. [d. Theorizing Orientalism, Said also has demonstrated that "European
culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as sort of a
surrogate and even underground self." [d.

HeinOnline -- 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 911 2005-2006

University of California, Davis

912

[Vol. 39:905

the working identity phenomenon constitutes discrimination. They also
have framed their arguments in the context of corporate law and law and
economics, by articulating such discrimination as a problem of corporate
and institutional incentives and practices that shape racial conduct and
14
workplace culfure. This is important and necessary work.
B.

The Need for the" Publicization" of Private Law

Like Carbado and Gulati, I am not persuaded that equality - as race
crits define it - can be achieved if it is only civil rights law that
expressly aspires to achieve it. Thus, I have attempted to similarly push
the boundaries of the theory from which my work is derived.
Specifically, I argue that doctrinal fields outside of traditional and
statutory antidiscrimination law can and should aspire towards equality
and the elimination of all forms of discrimination and subordination. In
answer to the question which other areas of law should so aspire, I have
turned naturally - as a contracts teacher as well as a race and fern crit to the law of contracts. In particular, I have focused on the doctrine of
good faith in the context of the contractual relationship between
employer and employee.
Does it make sense to turn to contract law and to the doctrine of good
faith in this way? I have asked and begun to answer these questions
(affirmatively, of course) in my other writings. IS For the sake of brevity, I
now offer two rather oversimplified responses, based on those writings,
to these questions. First, in terms of contract doctrine and as a
descriptive matter, I have argued that the doctrine of good faith and fair
dealing, despite some theoretical controversy in the established
scholarship, functions in contemporary contract law not so much as an
implied contract term but as a rhetorical proxy for judicial analyses of
material breach and constructive conditions relating to the underlying
breach of contract claims. While such applications of good faith have
functional value, they have caused good faith jurisprudence to languish
in an impoverished state, and to further detach from the doctrine's

14
See Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top, supra note 8 passim; Carbado & Gulati, The Law
and Economics of CRT, supra note 8 passim.
15
See Houh, Critical Interoentions, supra note I, at 1047-49 (critiquing dominant
economic model of good faith employed by courts); id. at 1089-95 (discussing Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in Schuster v. Derodli, 775 A.2d 1029 (Del. 2001), in which it held

that plaintiff could bring contractual breach of good faith claim to allege sexual harassment
against former employer); Houh, Critical Race Realism, supra note I, at 474-85 (arguing that
because good faith doctrine in contract law is in flux, it "furnishes an ideal vehicle by
which" to infuse private law of contract with public law norms of equality).
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16
equitable roots in implicit contractual obligation. Second, normatively
and more theoretically, I have argued from critical race (discussed briefly
above) and law and market economy perspectives that due to the
inadequacies of civil rights remedies, good faith should be used to
prohibit, in the contractual context, discriminatory conduct based on
race, gender, sexual identity, age, and/ or other categories of identity. I?
My proposed good faith antidiscrimination claim explicitly aims to
drive these descriptive, normative, and theoretical critiques into praxis
first by incorporating contemporary re-conceptualizations of
antidiscrimination jurisprudence. Second, my proposed claim moves
toward critical race praxis in that it grounds itself doctrinally not in
statutory antidiscrimination law, but in the contractually implied
obligation of good faith. Moreover, my proposed claim seeks to reconceive explicitly the private law doctrine of good faith as one that
might assist in effecting a public law norm of equality (critically
defined).
Many, if not most, traditional legal scholars might take issue with such
attempts to tamper with the well-entrenched distinction between private
ls
law and public law. However, I argue that deconstructing the publicprivate law distinction should playa more central role in the critical
scholarly project because of the ways in which the distinction has been
used to legally preserve and perpetuate existing structures and
distributions of power. I am certainly not the first to make this
argument. Critical and liberal scholars have long taken issue with the
public-private distinction, both as a descriptive and normative matter,
and have asked whether and to what extent the distinction between
private and public law should be maintained or deconstructed.
For example, Morris Cohen's realist critiques of the classical will
9
theory of contractualism in the early 1900s1 are foundational to much of
the work of contemporary scholars - critical and non-critical alike 16 Emily M.s. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law:
A (Nearly) Empty
Vessel?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1,49-56 [hereinafter Houh, Empty Vessel].
17 Houh, Critical Interventions, supra note 1 passim.
18 Conventional doctrinal categories of private law include fields such as contract,
property, and corporate law, while conventional doctrinal categories of public law include
fields such as constitutional and criminal law. For further discussion of the history of the
public-private law distinction, see Houh, Critical Race Realism, supra note 1, at 480-85.
19 See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 589 (1933)
(critiquing will theory and contractualism, and arguing that contract law, although
perceived as being "private" in nature, has essential public functions such as "to
standardize conduct by penalizing departures from the legal' norm," both through
awarding of damages or speCific performance for breaches of contract and through
declaration of certain contracts as void or voidable).
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and, in particular, to the work of those who continue to challenge the
20
now all-pervasive conventional economic analysis of the law. During
the same period, legal realist Robert Hale revealed the ways in which
legal and philosophical discourse had, until then, obscured the private
aspects of coercion while simultaneously vilifying its public aspects. To
Hale, threats and promises, whether public in the form of state
regulation or private in the form of negotiated contracts, were both
coercive in the amoral sense in that both function to influence a person's
conduct in positive and negative ways.21 To Hale, what made the
difference was power. That is, his distributive analysis focused not on
the coercive nature of public regulation and private exchange
transactions, but on whether power (as in "power of free initiative all
around," not absence of governmental restraint) was concentrated in the
22
hands of private or public actors.
Hale's analysiS in this regard prefigured theories of the circulative
nature of power. These theories are foundational to cultural studies and
critical theory.23 Theorizing how power circulates prompts the further
related question: to the extent American jurisprudence maintains the
distinction between public and private law, how does the institutional
and systemic line-drawing between the public and private domains
impact distributions of power and, consequently, economic and sociopolitical equality? Critical scholars like Duncan Kennedy24 and Clare
Dalton,25 among many others, have made cogent, persuasive, and
2ll
See, e.g., MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 2-4 (using Peircian
semiotics to reinterpret traditional economic analyses of law, and arguing that creativity
and discovery, not efficiency, drive wealth formation and maximization); Ian Ayres, Never
Confuse Efficiency with a Liver Complaint, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 503, 504-06 (describing
"hegemony of economic analysis" in law); Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of

Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235 (1998) (applying reconception of "rational choice" theory to effect
feminist economic analysis of contract law); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1740-53, 1762-66, 1776 (arguing that economic
principles embedded in legal rules and standards are "instrumental to the pursuit of
substantive objectives").
21 Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL.
ScI. Q. 470,471-79 (1923).
22 Id. at 477-78.
2:J See Stuart Hall, The Work of Representation, in REPRESENTATION:
CULTURAL
REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 41-51 (Stuart Hall ed., 1997) (discussing
circulative nature of discourse and its relationship to knowledge, truth, and power in
SOciety).
24
Kennedy, supra note 20, at 1740-53, 1762-66, 1776.
2S Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997,
1014 (1985) (arguing that "the Realist challenge to the 'privateness' of contract hard] been
assimilated and defused" within decades of original challenges in early twentieth century
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influential arguments about how the public-private law distinction
functions to mask structural and substantive inequalities in the legal
system.
Despite the significant scholarly contributions and triumphs of other
aspects of the legal realism movement,26 the continued entrenchment of
the public-private distinction remains to my mind one of the
movement's greatest failures. Feminist, critical, and liberal scholars
attempted to resuscitate the realist challenge to the public-private
distinction throughout the late 1970s and 1980s}7 but were largely
unsuccessful, perhaps because they were having more success staking
out their intellectual territories in other ways. In recent years, some
scholars interested in the public-private distinction have begun to
redirect their theoretical and doctrinal inquires and advocate the
28
extension of public law norms through privatization. This shift toward
the "publicization" of private domains is an extraordinarily important
one, given the increasingly important role private actors play in public
governance and administrative law, and given the spread of American
capitalism and the political and economic trend toward privatization of
institutions and systems historically regarded as essentially public.
My good faith project thus has another normative goal which is to
effect the "publicization" of the sub-category of the employer-employee

to public-private distinction).
2. For example, the V.c.c., a Realist project, has been adopted by every state in the
country, except Louisiana. David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 379
(2003). Its chief architect, Karl Llewellyn, was among the most important and well known
of the Realists. He argued that commercial law developed into its modem, stabilized state
not because it embodied and formalistically enacted a set of legal rules, but because
particularized social and economic circumstances compelled the judicial creation of a body
of law that developed into a coherent doctrine. See Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble
Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1671-73 (1982)
(discussing Karl Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society (pts. 1 & 2), 36 COLUM. L.
REV. 699 (1936), 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341 (1937».
27
See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 25 (reviving Realist public-private debate in context of
contract law); Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23
B.c. L. REV. 503 (1982) (tracing development of landlord-tenant law from its historical roots
in private law of contract, to its publicly regulated form); Symposium, The Public/private
Distinction, 130 V. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982) (this symposium on public-private distinction in
law featured paper topics such as history of distinction, state action and liberal theory, and
distinction in contexts of labor law and corporate law).
28
See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Exteading Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1285, 1288 (2003) (advocating for extension of public law norms through
privatization, given development of "relationship between administrative law and role
private actors play in public governance"); Snyder, supra note 26, at 371 (arguing that
because significant amount of law is privately made, such law should be subjected to same
kinds of questioning as publicly made law).
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contract vis-a.-vis the good faith doctrine. The specific and explicit goal
is to eliminate economic and socio-political subordination based on
categories of identity such as race, gender, and sex. Doctrinally, the
implied obligation of good faith is the ideal vehicle for such
publicization, given its murky definitional contours and its currently
hollow doctrinal state. Theoretically, it makes sense to use the implied
obligation of good faith to these ends because implied contractual
obligations arise for the very purpose of effecting and prescribing certain
cultural and social norms between contracting parties. The courts
transmit and enforce these norms as both a descriptive and normative
matter. In that sense, implied obligations are by their very nature public
obligations. Thus, they should incorporate public law norms.
Here, I want to address directly the "Future of Critical Race
Feminism" by suggesting that critical race feminists who also teach and
write in the traditional "private law" areas - such as contracts,
commercial law, business law, property, etc. - should begin and/or
continue to seriously (re-)engage and deconstruct the public-private
distinction in our work, for the reasons briefly discussed above. Fern
crits and race crits can and should make conscious and forceful
interventions not only into the conventionally race crit and fern crit areas
of constitutional law, criminal law, and statutory antidiscrimination law,
but also into areas that are not typically associated with Critical Race
Theory and/ or Critical Race Feminism.
I want to make clear that I am not the first to suggest and am certainly
not among the first to do this kind of work. As discussed above,
Carbado and Gulati are doing this work in their ongoing exploration and
interrogation of how corporate and workplace institutional practices and
incentives shape racial conduct and expectations. The late Jerome Culp
taught and wrote at the intersections of Critical Race Theory and law and
29
economics for much of his brilliant career. In addition, critical race
29
See, e.g., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil
Rights Act: The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965 (1993) (arguing
that dominant judicial interpretations of Title VII, which assume law's ineffectiveness in
controlling market forces to alleviate economic plight of black Americans, suffer from
several false assumptions); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Small Numbers, Big Problems, Black
Men, and the Supreme Court: A Reform Program for Title VII After Hicks, 23 CAP. U. L. REV.
241, 260-62 (1994) (arguing that existing Title VII jurisprudence does not give employers
incentive to hire and promote black employees, and proposing model for increasing
numbers of black workers hired by reducing costs associated with antidiscrimination
litigation); see also Robert S. Chang and Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Business as Usual?
Brown and the Continuing Conundrum of Race in America, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181, 1182-92
(2004) (examining, inter alia, racial wealth disparities and interlocking systems that
perpetuate racial inequalities from one generation to next and arguing that cycle of wealth
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feminists such as Patricia Williams,30 Cheryl Harris/ Elizabeth I lesias}2
Emma Coleman Jordan}3 Angela Harris,34 and Dorothy Brown,3 as well
as aligned feminist scholars like Kristin Brandser Kalsem,36 have
is self-perpetuating from generation to generation because of ways in which racial
discrimination in education, housing, family, health care, employment, and criminal justice
result in intergenerational perpetuation of racial economic disparities).
30
See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 8-14, 216-36
(1991) (critiquing purported objectivity and neutrality of law, particularly in contexts of
contract and property law); Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC:
Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1990) (analyzing implications of Metro
Broadcasting for racially diverse ownership of property within and beyond context of
commercial broadcasting).
31
See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993)
(arguing that whiteness as racial identity is deeply interrelated with concept of property
and examining effects of whiteness as racial property right in interpretation and
application of affirmative action law).
32
See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces and the Role of Critical Race
Theory in the Struggle for Community Control of Investments: An Institutional Class Analysis, 45
VILL. L. REV. 1037 (2000) (discussing global market effects of economic practices in racist
societies and, in particular, how racial segregation and discrimination have prevented free
movement of people and capital, and how free markets have not produced unrestricted
access to housing, employment, or credit, all of which are necessary to achieving social
racial justice).
33 See, e.g., Emma Coleman Jordan, A History Lesson: Reparations for What?, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 557 (2003) (proposing that call for reparations for slavery be replaced by
reparations for lynchings from 1865 to 1955 in order to conform with conventional private
law requirement of correlativity); see also EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS,
ECONOMIC JuSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS 1-72, 323-419 (2005)
(engaging connections between critical legal scholarship and law and economics).
34 JORDAN & HARRIS, supra note 33, at 323-419.
35 See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Fighting Racism in the Twenty-First Century, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1485 (2004) (providing overview of symposium on nexus between Critical Race
Theory and empirical studies in, inter alia, federal tax policy, race relations in employment
context, and lack of racial diversity on corporate boards); Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions, Risk,
and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (2004) (analyzing racial factors relating to employee
participation in employer-provided pension plans); Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and
Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469 (1997)
(exploring beneficial and penalizing impacts of federal tax law on married women based
upon their race, class, and gender, and discussing how federal tax laws tend to confer
benefits upon upper-income white households, while penalizing African-American
households and middle and low-income white households); Dorothy A. Brown, Racial
Equality in the Twenty-First Century: What's Tax Policy Got to Do with It?, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK 1. REV. 759 (1999) (arguing that federal tax laws permitting employers to deduct
discriminatory damage awards and diSCriminatory wages reinforce and exacerbate societal
racism); Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage PenaltylBonus Debate: Legislative Issues in Black and
White, 16 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 287, 287 (1999) (discussing impact of race on federal
income tax benefits and penalties and finding that "African-American households are more
likely to pay a marriage penalty and White households are more likely to receive a
marriage bonus").
36 See Kristin Brandser Kalsem, Bankruptcy Reform and Financial Well-Being:
How
Intersectionality Matters in Money Matters, 71 BROOK. 1. REV. (forthCOming 2006) (arguing
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integrated perspectives from private law areas such as property,
transnational globalism, commercial law, and economic analyses of law
into fern crit discourse, and vice versa.
This trend of critically engaging private law, however, has yet to
establish itself as a central part of the critical race tradition. We should
labor consciously to further establish this trend, not only because private
law provides us with rich substantive areas in which to continue our
work, but also because critically engaging conventional private law areas
is important as a strategic matter. Given the strength of our collective
intellect and the sharpness of our analyses, we can be more effective in
actually changing law as it is practiced by lawyers and interpreted by
judges if we, collectively and individually, broaden the scope of our
areas of expertise. Thus, I urge us to take a page from the playbook of
conventional law and economics scholars - if we are to be effective in
terms of praxis, we should tackle as many fields as possible. If there can
37
exist a Posnerian economic analysis of everything from contract law to
38
39
constitutional law to employment discrimination to sexuality,40 there
that discourse surrounding recent 2005 bankruptcy reform frames and analyzes women's
issues in essentialist ways, and calling for intersectional framing and analYSis of women's
issues in context of such reform).
37 See, e.g., RICHARD A POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93-143 (2003) (applying
economic analysis to various aspects of contract law).
38
See id. at 647-80 (applying economic analysis to wide range of constitutional issues
such as: separation of powers, protection of rights, equal protection and due process;
economic due process; federalism; discrimination; freedom of speech and freedom of
religion; and Fourth Amendment searches, seizures, and interrogations). See generally
Donald J. Boudreaux & AC. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of
the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 (1993) (developing economic
theory of constitutional amendment process that focuses particularly on roles of Congress
and interest groups in that process); John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 1411 (1986) (arguing that Title VII may enhance rather than impair economic
efficiency); Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 4 (1987) (discussing eight ways in which economics might be used to study and
interpret Constitution); Richard A Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) (developing (tentatively) "explicit economic approach to the
regulation of speech generally"); Lynn A Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An
Economic Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787 (1992)
(exploring impact of social choice theory on judicial review of statutes that burden
fundamental rights or employ suspect classifications).
39 See,
e.g., RICHARD A EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 66-69 (1992) (arguing that discrimination based on
irrational hatred of or distaste for people belonging to certain classifications (such as
women or minorities) will be extinguished by market forces because such distaste is
inefficient, but that "voluntary sorting" based on "commonality of preferences"- which
often tracks along racial, ethnic, or gender lines - will (and should) survive because it
increases satisfaction in workplace by allowing workers to avoid distasteful associations).
4()
See generally RICHARD A POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1994) (applying rational choice
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should also exist critical race and fern crit analyses across a similar
breadth of fields. Law and economics scholars have made such
trenchant inroads into the legal academy and judiciary, not only because
of the ideological conservatism of their positions, but also because they
have provided economic analyses for just about everything. To be
effective, we - fern crits and race crits - must at least do the same, with
the specific and explicit goal of infusing private law with critical race and
feminist norms. One small but hopeful contribution to this end is my
ongoing work on good faith in contract law. Having set out some
theoretical foundations for my contractual good faith antidiscrimination
claim, I now tum to some doctrine, and describe the elements of the
claim.
II.

THE ELEMENTS OF THE GOOD FAITH ANTIDISCRIMINATION CLAIM:
OPERATIONALIZING "WORKING IDENTITY" THEORY

Before describing the elements of the claim, it would be helpful to set
forth briefly the modem definition of contractual good faith. As I have
explained elsewhere, because good faith jurisprudence remains in an
41
unsettled state, the task is a somewhat difficult one. Very generally
speaking, the implied obligation of good faith requires that neither of the
contracting parties perform in such a way that deprives the other of her
42
reasonable expectations under the contract.
My proposed good faith claim focuses on what constitutes "reasonable
expectations" with respect to racial or gender subordination in the
workplace. In an attempt to move the "outsider" to the center of the
good faith discrimination claim, its proposed elements are framed
around the following assumption:
as part of their contractual
relationship with their employers, employees may reasonably expect not
to be bound to perform in a certain way based on pre-existing racial
and/or gender stereotypes. That is, employees may reasonably expect
not to have to perform within a set image repertoire. Any "scripted"
expectation that an employer has of a particular employee related to his
race and/or gender and, subsequently, to his work performance would
theory to history and development of sexuality and sexual controls).
41
Houh, Empty Vessel, supra note 16 (arguing that, as descriptive matter, good faith
doctrine in contemporary contract law functions as rhetorical proxy for judicial analyses of
material breach and constructive conditions relating to underlying breach of contract
claims, rather than as true implied obligation).
" Houh, Empty Vessel, supra note 16, at 49-50 (summarizing and clarifying different
courts' articulation and use of good faith standards based on different categories of
commercial contract cases).
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be deemed unreasonable.
This underlying premise incorporates
important critical race and feminist insights.
It rejects the
neoconservative colorblindness notions of racial equality and seeks to
remedy the ways in which existing outsider stereotypes negatively
impact how non-majority employees perform (and are incentivized to
perform) in the workplace. Framing reasonable expectations in this way
recognizes the harm to outsider employees not as a function of the
intentional acts of individual perpetrators, but as a function of
institutional and hegemonic cultural perceptions of and practices related
to outsider employees. As a practical matter, then, my proposed claim
shifts factual proof questions away from those relating to the alleged
perpetrator's intention to discriminate and toward those relating to how
the existence of race and gender stereotypes manifest and burden those
to whom such stereotypes attach.
Briefly, the elements of my proposed good faith antidiscrimination
claim require a plaintiff to demonstrate: the existence of relevant
stereotype(s) that have attached to the plaintiff; how those attached
stereotypes negatively impact work performance; and that the employer
took some negative employment action against the plaintiff; and
causation.
A.

Proving the Existence of Stereotypes, or Demonstrating One's Working
Identity

In its most current form, the first element of my proposed claim

requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of factually relevant
racial and/or gender stereotype(s) in society generally and more
specifically in the plaintiff-employee's workplace, as well as the
corresponding absence of such an image repertoire for white males.
Proving this element is not as onerous as it sounds. Research and
scholarship on the causes and effects of stereotyping in the workplace
and their impact on productivity abound in the social sciences and even
in the humanities.
Such findings could help prove the general
pervasiveness of stereotypes relating in particular to minority groups
and/or women. For example, scholarship in the fields of management
science and behavioral and cognitive psychology, as well as in areas
dealing with more theoretical representational issues such as cultural
studies, would be particularly helpful.
While proving the existence of those stereotypes would be onerous to
the plaintiffs and lawyers bringing the first generation of such good faith
antidiscrimination claims, the benefits of this work would outweigh its
initial costs, as future generations of lawyers could rely on evidence
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introduced in successful "test" cases, needing only to update that
evidence and research as necessary. In addition, bringing such evidence
to the attention of judges, defense lawyers, and juries would have
educative benefits that also might impact socio-cultural understandings
of discrimination and racial and gender scripting. Lastly, in response to
legitimate concerns relating to the overly theoretical direction of
scholarly work on race and gender equality issues (and at the risk of
sounding like a self-interested academic), the employment of such
evidence would bring the work of practitioners and critical scholars
closer together in their service to the common goal of a just and equal
society.
In its defense against the establishment by the plaintiff of this first
element of the prima facie claim, a defendant-employer would have the
opportunity to introduce contradictory social science research on societal
stereotyping. However, an employer most likely would concentrate its
efforts on proving that the relevant stereotype did not exist or function
discursively at its workplace. Thus, for example, the employer could
attempt to show that its workplace was meaningfully integrated, and
that a "critical mass,,43 of women and/or people of color were present
there. The employer also could demonstrate its attempts to combat these
kinds of stereotypes through existing policies and/or programs.

43 The term "critical mass" is fast-becoming a legal term of art, based on its use in
affirmative action discourse. The Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger (the University of
Michigan Law School affirmative action case) stated:

The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on 'any belief that
minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic
minority viewpoint on any issue: To the contrary, diminishing the force of such
stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one that it
cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students. Just as
growing up in a particular region or having particular professional experiences is
likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own, unique experience of
being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still
matters ....
[T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each
applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might
contribute to a diverse educational environment. . .. [T]he Law School affords
this individualized consideration to applicants of all races.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.s. 306, 309, 333 (2003) (citation omitted); see also Brief for
Respondent at 40-43, Grutter, 539 U.s. 306 (No. 02-241) (discussing why University of
Michigan does not employ "quota" in admitting "critical mass" of students of color).
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B. The Impact of Attached Stereotypes on Work Performance
Having alleged the existence of particular social stereotypes in the
workplace, the plaintiff would next allege how her working identity
impacted her work performance. The specifics of her allegations would
of course depend on the nature of the stereotype her employer allegedly
manifested. Did she feel compelled to counter-perform her working
identity because of negative (or positive) stereotypes that attached to
her? For example, did she speak out against the imposed stereotypes or
perform against script? If so, what kinds of risks did she incur in
counter-performing? On the other hand, did she feel that she had to
perform to a certain "positive" stereotype for fear that her failure to do
so would result in negative action against her? If so, what kinds of
conduct did she engage in and/ or risks did she incur in response to that
pressure?
C.

Negative Employment Action, Expanded

The third element of the claim requires the plaintiff to allege that her
employer took some negative or adverse employment action against her.
Although Title VII jurisprudence also requires a showing of adverse
employment action, this element, for purposes of the proposed claim,
would employ a much broader definition of "adverse employment
action." The proposed claim would give more primacy to the material
impact on the plaintiff, based on the types of risks she incurred and the
extent to which those risks manifested.

D.

Causation - A Rebuttable Presumption

Predictably, the element of causation, which links racial and gender
scripting to adverse action and impact on the plaintiff, is the most
difficult element to develop, particularly because conventional
antidiscrimination discourse has taught us that the intent to discriminate
is the linchpin of causation. How, then, should causation be theorized,
given that one explicit goal of my proposed claim is to deconstruct the
dominant intent analysis? Courts can and should presume a correlation
between stereotypes that have attached in the workplace, and the
burdensome expectations imposed on the plaintiff as a result of her
failure to perform and/or counterperform her working identity. Thus,
the presumption that the plaintiff's counter-performance of her scripted
working identity caused the alleged adverse employment action arises
when the adverse action and/or impact follows the counterperformance. The court may then find that there has been a breach of
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good faith in that the employer has deprived the employee of her
reasonable expectation of not having to perform to or against a
stereotype. On the flipside, the court may find that the employer has
imposed unreasonable expectations on the plaintiff by requiring her to
perform according to a scripted identity.44
It is certainly possible that an employer might take adverse action
against an employee simply because she is a bad employee. Under the
good faith antidiscrimination claim, the defendant could still defend
itself by demonstrating a "legitimate business purpose," but the
defendant would have to assert and prove its "legitimate business
purpose" as an affirmative defense, rather than as part of a burden-shifting
framework such as the one imposed by McDonnell-Douglas in statutory
45
Doing so would also eliminate the pretext analysis, which is
cases.
consistent with the dual goal of de-emphasizing and deconstructing
discriminatory intent as the keystone of legally cognizable
discrimination. Further, this scheme makes relevant the plaintiff's
perspective on the circumstances of the alleged adverse action.

E.

A Work in Progress, but Moving Toward Praxis

I am acutely aware of the many doctrinal and theoretical questions
that my good faith claim raises and I emphasize that it is a work in
progress. Most significantly, I myself wonder as a practical matter
whether courts and juries should and could be trusted to engage in the
type of analyses my claim contemplates. The optimist in me believes
that as we continue to train good critical race lawyers, the availability of
such a claim would have potentially valuable expressive and educative
value. In transferring the lessons of critical race and feminist legal
theory to plaintiffs, defendants, their lawyers, judges, and jurors through
the elements of the claim, the law might alter the rhetoric of
discrimination and colorblindness that now dominates civil rights law.
It might also impact popular cultural understanding of how racial

" Elsewhere, I have discussed at length precedent in the area of corporate securities
law for accepting such a presumption of causation. In particular, the "fraud on the market"
theory, adopted by the Supreme Court in a landmark decision on securities fraud. In short,
the fraud on the market theory presumes that material misrepresentations, once proven,
cause investors to trade on stock because of the investor's presumptive reliance on those
misrepresentations in so trading. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.s. 224,241-50 (1988); see also
Houh, Critical Race Realism, supra note 1, at 502-05.
45
See supra note 7 (discussing burden shifting framework established by McDonnell

Douglas).
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subordination exists and persists as a historical and socially
contextualized phenomenon.
On a more general level, making available a non-statutory, non-civil
rights claim would express a radically different and more profound
commitment to racial, gender, and sex equality. Fashioning the claim as
a breach of good faith claim would place the equality principle, which
currently plays a lesser role in contract law,46 on the same level as the
principle of free and individual will in contracting, a value prioritized in
both classical and modern contract law.
Thus, the good faith
discrimination claim would allow two purportedly competing values,
equality and freedom to contract (or not to contract), to more pro-actively
and equally co-exist. Moreover, theoretically and doctrinally, my
proposed claim incorporates critical race values into the contractual
doctrine of good faith, thereby enacting a doctrinal response to Carbado
and Gulati's theoretical assertion that "the 'working identity'
phenomenon is a form of employment discrimination.,,47
III.

POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM

As just mentioned, my good faith antidiscrimination claim was
developed with the operationalization of Carbado and Gulati's working
identity theory in mind. Could it be used to similarly concretize some
basic tenets of CRF? I argue that the claim can be so used, specifically
with respect to the related fern crit concepts of anti-essentialism and
intersectionality. In so arguing, I analyze how the good faith claim
might be used to remedy discrimination - in the form of sexual
harassment - based on intersectional categories of identity when
statutory antidiscrimination claims fail to do so. I use an involved
hypothetical to help make my case.
A.

Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality Defined, and Some Responses to
Critiques Thereof

Although it is quite likely that the targeted audience of this
symposium has a good sense of what the terms anti-essentialism and
intersectionality mean, I want to take a brief moment to specifically
define those terms as I use them. In her foundational piece, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, Angela Harris defines gender
46 Inequality of bargaining occupies an important role in contract law vis-a-vis the
doctrines of, for example, unconscionability, undue influence, duress, incapacity, and
misrepresentation.
47 Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 9, at 1262.
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essentialism as "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience
can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual
orientation, and other realities of experience.,,48 Harris further critiques
the use of gender essentialism in (feminist) legal theory:
The result of this tendency toward gender essentialism . . . is not
only that some voices are silenced in order to privilege others (for
this is an inevitable result of categorization, which is necessary both
for human communication and political movement), but that the
voices that are silenced tum out to be the same voices silenced by
the mainstream legal voice of "We the People" - among them, the
voices of black women.
This troubles me for two reasons. First, the obvious one: As a
black woman, in my opinion the experience of black women is too
often ignored both in feminist theory and legal theory. . .. A second
and less obvious reason for my criticism of gender essentialism is
that, in my view, contemporary legal theory needs less abstraction
and not simply a different sort of abstraction. To be fully
subversive, the methodology of feminist legal theory should
challenge not only law's content but its tendency to privilege the
abstract and unitary voice, and this gender essentialism also fails to
49
d o.
Several feminist legal scholars, some of whom Harris explicitly
criticized in her famous article, have responded negatively to Harris'
critique of gender essentialism. They claim that anti-essentialist theory
is, simply put, too post-modem to be of any use in the elimination of
legally sanctioned and institutionalized forms of gender subordination.
Specifically, they have argued that the deconstruction of the socially
constructed category of women (as representative of the falsely universal
white, American, middle-class woman) elides the oppressive power of
patriarchy, which is still so entrenched in our cultural, economic, and
50
sociopolitical realities. Similarly, others (including some race and fern
48
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
585 (1990).
•

ld.
See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 OiL-KENT L.
REV. 687, 693 (2000) (arguing that: "Postmodernism ... derealizes social reality by ignoring
it, by refusing to be accountable to it, and, in a somewhat new move, by openly repudiating
any connection with an 'it' by claiming 'it' is not there."); Robin West, Feminism, Critical
Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 59 (arguing that "the four central ideas of
critical social theory proven to be of most interest to critical legal theorists - ideas that
center around the nature of power, of knowledge, of morality and of the self - will not be
49

5(J
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crits) have argued that anti-essentialist theory, applied to its logical
extreme, potentially devolves into neoliberal notions of the atomistic,
individual self. In traditional antidiscrimination and equality discourse,
the application of this dominant notion of individuality has already
resulted in the law's emphasis on intentionality and the "perpetrator
perspectives. ,,51 This has further resulted in the law's disregard for the
harm caused to victims of material and ideological conditions of
52
subordination. Ironically, the law's continual move toward wholesale
adoption of such conceptions of individuality, self, and free will have
been at the center of critical race critique since its inception in the early
1980s.
These critiques of anti-essentialism are compelling, especially when
considered in light of the way critical studies in the humanities (of
French and American origins) since the 1980s has shifted toward a
hyper-formalistic and depoliticized expertise.
These studies are
comprehensible only to the very small community of scholars and
students completely devoted to its rhetoric and study.s3 The late Edward
Said, one of our most important critical and literary scholars, criticized
this trend as "virtually abandon[ing] any attempt at reaching a large, if
not a mass, audience.,,54 Said persuasively argued that this development
in critical studies does not embody the political and "radically antiinstitutional bias" that gave rise to Franco-American critical studies. In
response to critics of fem crits who employ (some) postrnodern theory
and methodology, I add that this development likewise does not embody
55
the spirit and goals of CRF.
Thus, I assert that these critiques are
misguided to the extent that they suggest that anti-essentialist theory
should be de-prioritized or even excised as part of critical race and/or
feminist legal methodology because of its connection to formalistic
critical studies in the humanities. In particular, they are misguided
because they seem to assume that anti-essentialism's proponents
advocate a limitless and depoliticized application of the theory that
ignores the central issue of power. This is simply not the case.
helpful even to our understanding of patriarchy, and will frustrate rather than further our
attempts to end it").
51
See Freeman, supra note 3, at 1052-57.
52
Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Critical Race Coalitions: Key Movements that Performed
the Theory, 33 u.c. DAVIS L. REV. 1377,1413-16 (2000) (critiquing postmodem "sublimation"
of critical race concepts such as anti-essentialism).
53
See Edward W. Said, Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, and Community, in
REFLECTIONS ON EXILE AND OrnER ESSAYS 118, 121-24 (2000).
54
[d. at 124.
55 [d. at 122-24.
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Moreover, such critiques by implication wrongly characterize fern crits
as uncommitted to the political project that inspires most, if not all, fern
crit scholars, teachers, and activists: the elimination of forms of
subordination based on interlocking identity based categories such as
race, gender, and sex, and the elimination of material conditions
resulting from that subordination.
Kimberle Crenshaw's intersectionality theory, which is closely related
to anti-essentialism theory, further exemplifies the antisubordination
commitments of fern crits, as well as the contextualized and complex
56
nature of these theories. In another article foundational to Critical Race
Feminism, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, Crenshaw critiques the structural inadequacies of
existing antidiscrimination discourse:
With Black women as the starting point, it becomes more apparent
how dominant conceptions of discrimination condition us to think
about subordination as disadvantage occurring along a single
categorical axis .... In ... race discrimination cases, discrimination
tends to be viewed in terms of sex- or class-privileged Blacks; in sex
discrimination cases, the focus is on race-and class-privileged
women.
This focus on the most privileged group members marginalizes
those who are multiply-burdened and obscures claims that cannot
be understood as resulting from discrete sources of discrimination.
I suggest further that this focus on otherwise-privileged group
members creates a distorted analysis of racism and sexism because
the operative conceptions of race and sex become grounded in
experiences that actually represent only a subset of a much more
57
complex phenomenon.
Crenshaw's call to incorporate intersectionality analyses into
antidiscrimination discourse as well as Harris' call to likewise
incorporate anti-essentialist analyses exemplify the consciously political
employment of critical concepts. Fern crits are, in fact, ideally situated to

56
See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1993) (critiquing "singleaxis" framework of antidiscrimination law in contexts of feminist legal theory and
domestic violence).
57 Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139, 140.

HeinOnline -- 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 927 2005-2006

928

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 39:905

engage in this kind of work because we interpret and analyze legal texts
and contexts and because we understand how law constructs and reifies
existing distributions of power in a complex, material, and discursive
way. We must continue to engage critical methodologies in our
interpretations and analyses of legal texts and contexts so that we may,
in Said's words, continue as feminist, critical, and legal scholars to
"connect ... these more politically vigilant forms of interpretation to an
ongoing political and social praxis."ss
B.

A Further Move Toward Praxis: Critical Race Feminism, Sexual
Harassment, and the Good Faith Antidiscrimination Claim

How might my good faith claim be used to connect the "politically
vigilant forms" of interpretation and analysis initiated by fem crits to an
"ongoing political and social praxis?" More particularly, how might it
be used to connect anti-essentialism and intersectionality theory with an
ongoing sociopolitical praxis that involves the incorporation of private
law with critical race equality norms (what I have called elsewhere
"critical race realism,,)?59 Although I think that the claim could be used
in many different ways to connect such theory with what I'll refer to as
critical race realism praxis,60 I again focus my attention on contractual
relationships in the workplace, and more specifically on how sexual
harassment in the workplace impacts those contractual relationships. I
do so, first, because, as many feminist legal scholars and fem crits have
demonstrated, existing sexual harassment jurisprudence, like most
conventional antidiscrimination jurisprudence, has proven to be so
inadequate in addressing gender subordination. Second, I focus on
sexual harassment because women of color who endure it in the
workplace face a peculiarly intersectional type of harassment, or as Sumi
Said, supra note 53, at 147.
Houh, Critical Race Realism, supra note 1 passim.
60
For example, I could argue that my good faith claim be used in cases involving welldocumented discrimination against black women in retail car sale negotiations. See
generally IAN AYRES, PERVASNE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001) (presenting evidence of (unintentional) race and gender
discrimination in various retail markets); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race
Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991) (presenting evidence
of discrimination against, in particular, black women in context the of retail car
negotiations); Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and
Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109 (1995) (same). In this regard, I would also have
to argue as a matter of contract doctrine that the good faith obligation should apply to
contract formation as well as performance and enforcement, which is against the weight of
authority in American contract law. See Houh, Empty Vessel, supra note 16; supra text
accompanying notes 370-74.
58

59
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Cho has named it, a type of "racialized sexual harassment.,,61
As is well known, Title VII prohibits two types of sexual harassment:
62
quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment harassment. Quid
pro quo harassment, recognized as economic in its nature, involves
demands for sexual favors or sexual contact in exchange for "concrete
employment benefits.,,63 Hostile environment harassment, recognized on
the other hand as non-economic or less economic in nature, arises when
"sexual misconduct . . . has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.,,64
Of the two types of harassment claims, quid pro quo claims are
"easiest" for courts to recognize, at least definitionally and theoretically.
Hostile environment claims are harder in light of how "hostile
environment" has been defined by the courts.
What does
"unreasonabl[e] interfer[ence] with an individual's work performance"
look like? What is an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment?" Writing for the majority in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
Justice O'Connor defined the hostile work environment standard as
65
having both objective and subjective components. Actionable sexual
misconduct must be "severe and pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment.,,66 Additionally, "if the
victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the
conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's
employment, [and] there is no Title VII violation.,,67 Justice O'Connor
added that one need not suffer a "nervous breakdown" in order to bring
an actionable hostile environment claim. She also conceded that even
environments that do "not seriously affect employees' psychological
well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job performance,
discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from
advancing in their careers.,,68 Notwithstanding these concessions, it is
safe to say that the standard set forth in Harris is problematic from
feminist and fern crit perspectives. It is of little to no comfort that
61
Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model
Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 182-95 (1997).

Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987).
64
Meritor, 477 U.s. at 2404-05 (quoting EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R § 1604.11(a)(3)
(1985)).
65
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993).
66
Id.
67 Id. at 21-22.
68
Id. at 22.
62

63
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women need not be driven to mental and emotional breakdown or be
seriously psychologically damaged in order for them to bring cognizable
hostile environment claims. Most women who face harassment at work
occupy the vast middle terrain created by the Harris standard, and Title
VII does not necessarily recognize the discriminatory nature of their
experiences as deserving of remedy.69
I argue that my good faith claim could be used to remedy the harm
that these women incur from sexual misconduct in the workplace.
Further, my claim would be especially well-suited for this purpose when
we consider the economic, as well as psychological injury caused by
sexual harassment, irrespective of how such harassment is categorized
by Title VII. Gillian Hadfield's insights in this regard are invaluable.
She writes:
The dichotomy [between economic effects of quid pro quo
harassment and the non-economic effects of hostile environment
harassment] is false because even if the harasser does not threaten to
inflict direct economic injury, the victim's response to a harassing
environment may have an economic effect. This may be true even if
the harassment has no negative psychological impact on the victim;
indeed, it may be true even if the harassment is not [subjectively]
"offensive" to the recipient. Even women who are equipped with
nerves and countenances of steel may nonetheless take action to
their detriment in response to harassment.
By analyzing the hostile environment case as one of discrimination
in the intangible psychological benefits of employment, courts have
missed the essential violation of Title VII that harassment
perpetuates - the introduction of a discriminatory factor into
. ch'
women,s econonuc
Olces. m
Hadfield's feminist and law and economics work in the context of sexual
harassment and contract law exemplifies how economic analyses of the
law might be brought to bear on critical analyses of the law, and vice
71
versa.

69 In their excellent casebook, GENDER AND LAW: 'THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY,
Katharine Bartlett, Angela Harris, and Deborah Rhode collected a number of resources
demonstrating the pervasive, if not legally actionable, presence of sexual harassment in the
workplace. KATHARINE T. BARTLEIT ET AL., GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE,
COMMENTARY 18-44, 137-249 (3d ed. 2002).
70 Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAL. 1. REV.
1151,1168 (1995).
71
See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas
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In this regard, if we understand that the law of contract, in its most
traditional sense, is concerned with the private ordering (and
performance) of obligations and choices mutually assented to by
contracting parties, and further understand the ways in which women's
choices within their contractual relationships are constrained because of
sexual harassment, then we can see how my proposed good faith claim
might be used to restore and preserve women's economic choices their expectations under the contract - in the face of such harassment.
Moreover, using the good faith claim to combat the economic
deprivation caused by sexual harassment incorporates notions of
antisubordination equality theory that the law of sexual harassment was
72
originally designed to operationalize. And finally, to the extent my
good faith claim could be used to combat particularly racialized forms of
sexual harassment, it can help alleviate the broader economic
73
inequalities suffered by working women of color.
1.

A Law Firm Hypothetical: Christina

So, what kind of case am I contemplating? I am thinking of a hostile
environment situation that would not be actionable under current Title
VII sexual harassment law because either the objective or subjective
prong of the claim would not be satisfied under Harri.s. Imagine
Christina, a young Korean American law graduate, has just commenced
working as an associate at a mid-sized law firm in a large city in the
Midwest. She is one of only two Asian Americans at the firm, the other
being an older male partner. During the first week at her firm, she, like
all new employees, was required to sit through a "diversity program"
with a message consisting primarily of two maxims: "This is a colorblind firm" and "We value diversity."
to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235 (1998)
(applying feminist economist conceptions of "rational choice" theory to legal reasoning in
contract law).
72
Of course, Catharine MacKinnon first argued that sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination, and not many years later, it became actionable under Title VII. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 143-48 (1st ed. 1979).
73 For example, a June 2004 report issued by the National Women's Law Center reports
that women of color still face significant economic inequities in the workplace: "Women
working full-time year-round still suffer a pay gap, and earn only about 77 cents for every
dollar earned by men. Women of color fare even worse, with African-American women
earning only 66 cents, and Hispanic women 54 cents, to each dollar earned by a white
man." Press Release, National Women's Law Center, NWLC Celebrates 40"' Anniversary of
Title VII (June 28, 2004), available at http://www.nw1c.org/details.cfm?id=1920&
section=newsroom.

HeinOnline -- 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 931 2005-2006

932

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 39:905

Dave, a white male who has recently been made a partner at the firm,
assigns her to a complex and important case on which he is the lead
partner. This requires Dave and Christina to spend a lot of time
together, with Christina spending roughly half of her billable hours on
Dave's big case.
One night as Christina is eating dinner over boxes of documents in a
conference room at the firm, Dave decides to "check in" on her. He
addresses her family history, asking, "Where are you originally from?"
She tells him Cleveland. Dave looks perplexed and asks, "Is that where
your parents are from?" "No," Christina replies, inwardly exasperated
with the tired line of questions, "My parents immigrated from Korea."
With that, Dave begins to tell her about his own personal history and
background. He states that in college he exclusively dated Asian
women. He adds, "1 still think Asian women make the best girlfriends
but, for me, it was just a phase." Christina is very quiet; she is quite
offended by Dave's comments and knows that if she doesn't keep her
mouth shut, she will say things that she might later regret. Given how
new she is to the firm and her lowly status as a first-year associate, she
does not want to make waves.
Dave finally decides it's time to go, leaving Christina alone to continue
her work.
However, Christina finds that she is having trouble
concentrating. She makes a call to her best friend Tammy, a classmate of
hers from law school who is also Asian American, and tells her about
what just happened. Trying to make the best of her situation and give
Dave the benefit of the doubt, Christina wonders whether Dave was
somehow trying to connect with or impress her by so forthrightly
sharing certain aspects of his personal life. She wonders if he was aware
of how uncomfortable his comments made her feel. She and Tammy
discuss whether Christina should have been more forthcoming and
assertive about Christina's discomfort, but decide that not responding
was the best thing to do at this point in time. They hope that Dave does
not attempt to engage Christina again in this type of conversation and
agree that Christina will avoid discussing personal issues with Dave.
Christina sees that it is now late and decides to leave for the night. She
has lost at least a couple of billable hours talking with Tammy about her
interaction with Dave and knows she'll have to make up the time later in
the week.
Over the course of the next several weeks, Dave attempts a few more
times to engage Christina on the topic of interracial dating (specifically
between white men and Asian women). Christina does her best to stick
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to her general strategy of non-responsiveness. However, in her attempts
to put off conversation without sounding "overly sensitive" she has at
times said things to Dave like, "Well, I understand your interest in all of
this and appreciate that you've thought about it, but I'm not an expert on
interracial dating." Moreover, these conversations invariably occur
while Christina is hard at work and she finds that on days when these
incidents occur, her efficiency and productivity decline because she
becomes preoccupied with how to deal effectively with these situations.
For Christina, this simply means that she works later on those days or
during the weekends to make up for lost time. There is no noticeable
decline in her monthly billable hours, which are comparatively high, but
there is some inconsistency in her week-to-week performance.
Fortunately, after several weeks, Christina's strategy of general nonresponsiveness seems to work, and Dave stops talking to her so much
about his personal interest in Asian women.
Then one night at a cocktail hour, during a conversation with
Christina and the Asian American partner, Jim, Dave comments on how
much work Christina has done on his big case, and refers jokingly to
Christina as his "hard-working geisha." He quickly follows this with,
"I'm just kidding, of course, but she is doing great work for me."
Christina is stunned and is sure her face is giving her away. To her
surprise, Jim simply laughs and says, "Well, Christina is of course a hard
worker. Christina, keep up the good work." Jim then walks away.
Christina says to Dave, "I really object to your use of the term 'geisha'
and .... " Before she can finish, Dave simply says, "Can't you take a
joke? Anyway, I meant it as a compliment - even Jim got that." Dave
then walks away.
Christina tries to mingle a bit more before leaving the cocktail hour, as
she doesn't want to be seen "storming off" early. Afterwards, she calls
Tammy to talk with her about the incident. Christina concedes, "I'm
worried about coming off like I can't take a joke or like I'm too sensitive.
Jim didn't seem to be offended by it." Tammy asks, "Do you think Jim
was just trying to change the subject? Do you think you should talk with
him about it?" Christina is unsure, "I don't know. He seemed fine with
all of it, and I don't want him to not give me assignments because I seem
like a whiner. He's a partner, after all. And before me, he was the only
Asian American at the firm. He probably had to put up with a lot of
stuff, so how would I look if I started complaining when I'm not even
through my first year here?" Ultimately, Christina decides not to talk to
Jim because she doesn't want to be tagged as a troublemaker at this early
stage in her career at the firm. But, she is not entirely satisfied with this
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because she feels that by remaining quiet about it, she is playing into the
stereotype that Dave certainly has of Asian women as being passive,
compliant, and obedient. She is also concerned that this stereotype has
been indirectly reinforced by Jim.
The following few weeks pass without incident. Then, one day, Dave
tells Christina to pick up at their shared printer a draft brief that the two
have been working on so that she can read and comment on it. Christina
does so and finds that the last two pages he has printed are hardcopies of
an internet personal ad. It includes a photo of a scantily clad Asian with
long hair that reads: "Hot, tiny Asian woman looking to serve and
submit." Christina is mortified. She sees Dave as she returns to her
office. He is laughing and she says to him, "This is disgusting." He
glances at the internet ad and says, "God, Christina, lighten up," and
walks laughing into his office. Christina goes to her desk to continue her
work and decides that aside from the case she is currently working on
with Dave, she will decline to take any further assignments from him.
She decides that if necessary, she will solicit work from other partners in
order to avoid having to work further with Dave. She recognizes that
doing so will bring certain risks in terms of her reputation with other
partners and whether they will want to work with her, but that this risk
is worth incurring given how strongly she now feels about not working
with Dave. She also decides to start keeping a journal of these incidents
for her own self-protection.
In this somewhat involved hypothetical, it is (hopefully) clear to those
of us who consider ourselves feminists and fern crits that Christina has
suffered from racialized sexual harassment. But given the (in)frequency
of the objectionable incidents, these facts probably do not give rise to an
actionable Title VII hostile environment claim. Dave's comments about
interracial dating and his one-time use of the term "geisha" would
probably be construed not as "physically threatening or humiliating" but
as "mere offensive utlerance[s].,,74 Moreover, it is unclear whether
Christina, on a subjective level, found the environment "abusive"
and/ or whether her "psychological well-being" was significantly
affected. 75 Although she had a difficult time deciding how to handle
Dave, it seems that she actually dealt with the situation(s) with minimal
psychological turmoil. Moreover, it is unclear whether the environment
"detract[ed] from [Christina's] job performance" and/or kept her from

" Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,23 (1993) (discussing types of circumstances
that determine whether environment is "hostile" or "abusive").
75

[d.
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advancing in her career at the firm. Although Christina would get
temporarily distracted from her work in the aftermath of each incident,
she was still able to maintain her billable hours, continue to be
productive and do "great work."
Notwithstanding all this, it still r~mains that Christina, as an Asian
American woman, is burdened by her environment in ways that other
employees of the firm are not. Moreover, it is clear that even if we
assume that Christina is a woman "equipped with· nerves and
countenances of steel," she "nonetheless [took] action to [her] detriment
in response to [the] harassment" by deciding not to take further
76
assignments from Dave. That is, even if the harassment did not impact
Christina's psychological well-being, it introduced a "discriminatory
factor" in Christina's "economic choices.,,77 As Hadfield has pointed out,
this is exactly what existing Title VII law on sexual harassment misses.
2.

Christina's Good Faith Antidiscrimination Claim

My proposed good faith antidiscrimination claim could be used to fill
these gaps in Title VII, and to capture and remedy the economic harm
caused by this type of hostile environment harassment. Also, more
specific to CRF, it could be used to remedy such harm when it is based
78
on racialized sexual harassment.
For example, if Christina were to
bring a good faith antidiscrimination claim against her firm, that claim
would be based on her reasonable expectation under the contract not to
be subjected to stereotypes of Asian women as not only hard-working,
obedient, and compliant (a racialized and gendered stereotype), but also
as sexually available in a particularly racialized way. That such
stereotypes exist in society generally would not be difficult to prove.
Sumi Cho, a legal scholar as well as a scholar of ethnic studies, has
written extensively about intersectional discrimination faced by Asian

Hadfield, supra note 70, at 1168.
Id.
78
Intersectional discrimination in the form, for example, of racialized sexual
harassment, is not actionable everywhere.
Intersectional discrimination has been
recognized, however, in a number of jurisdictions as a legally cognizable claim. See, e.g.,
Lam v. Univ. of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that when plaintiff
claims race and sex bias, it is necessary to determine whether employer discriminated on
basis of combination of factors, and not just on whether it discriminated against persons of
same race or of same sex); Jeffries v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034
(5th Cir. 1980) (holding that nondiscriminatory treatment of black males and white females
is irrelevant to question of discrimination against black female claiming bias on both racial
and gender grounds).
76

77
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79

American women in the workplace. Significantly, she has brought into
antidiscrimination and legal discourse important analyses of the
historical racialized sexualization and fetishization of Asian women in
Western culture. She writes:
The projection of a privately compliant and catering Asia
femininity, predisposed to the assertion of white male desire, is
overlaid upon a super-competent, professional public exterior.
Accordingly, the converging stereotype feeds harassers' belief that
Asian Pacific American women will be receptive to their
aggressively heterosexual advances, that regardless of how
competent or professional such women appear, they will make good
victims, and will not fight back.
[T]he process of objectification that women in general experience
takes on a particular virulence with the overlay of race upon gender
stereotypes. Generally, objectification diminishes the contributions
of all women, reducing their worth to male perceptions of female
sexuality. In the workplace, objectification comes to mean that the
value of women's contributions will be based not on their
professional accomplishments or work performance, but on male
perceptions of their vulnerability to harassment. Asian Pacific
women suffer greater harassment exposure due to racialized
ascriptions (for example, they are exotic, hyper-eroticized,
masochistic, desirous of sexual domination, etc.) that set them up as
so
ideal gratifiers of western neocolonial libidinal formations.
In the hypothetical involving Christina, that these stereotypes of Asian
women existed at the firm also would be relatively easy to prove, given
the nature of Dave's comments about the "hard working geisha," and
especially because he connected this stereotype to Christina's work
performance. Moreover, Dave's repeated attempts to discuss with
Christina interracial dating between white men and Asian women, his
use of the loaded representational term "geisha" in reference to her, and
his leaving the internet personal ad where Christina would find it
demonstrate Dave's ascribing to Christina the racialized and sexualized
stereotypes of Asian women as "exotic, hyper-eroticized, masochistic,
[and] desirous of sexual domination." Combined with Christina's
professionalism and ultimately consistent productivity throughout,
Dave's comments further demonstrate that he held a stereotype of

79 Cho, supra note 61 passim.
so ld. at 186, 191.

HeinOnline -- 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 936 2005-2006

2006]

Toward Praxis

937

Christina as "receptive" to his arguably veiled sexual advances and as a
"good victim" who would "not fight back."
The firm would have an opportunity to counter Christina's evidence of
the existence of such racially sexualized stereotypes in the workplace.
However, diversity training that relies on the feel-good rhetoric of
colorblindness and employer proclamations of "valuing diversity" are
poor substitutes for programs, policies, and institutional norms and
practices that would actually result in the hiring, retention, and
promotion of critical masses of women and people of color. Moreover,
the firm would have a difficult time proving the absence of relevant
stereotypes, given that Christina and Jim are the only two Asian
Americans employees of the firm, Jim's reaction to Dave's "geisha"
comment at the cocktail party, and the failure of the firm's diversity
program to expose its employees to any meaningful discussion of race
and gender difference in the workplace.
Under my proposed claim, Christina would next have to show how
the stereotypes, when imposed upon her as a type of "working identity,"
impacted her work performance.
Christina both performed and
counterperformed against this working identity. In her attempt to
appear professional in the face of Dave's misconduct by trying to be nonresponsive and by not complaining to anyone about it for fear of being
perceived as a troublemaker (and, thus, not a team player), she
undertook certain risks. For example, her conduct might have had and
probably would have had the undesired effect of reinforcing stereotypes
about her passivity and status as a good victim who would not fight
back. At the same time, Christina was acutely aware that others might
attach such stereotypes to her. Thus, when pushed to her limit, she
objected to being referenced as a "geisha" and to the internet personal ad
left for her by Dave. In objecting and counter-performing her identity,
Christina of course incurred other risks with respect to Dave, her
superior. Would he tell other partners that she was uptight and
oversensitive? If so, what would the reputational fallout be? Would it
result in fewer opportunities to work with others at the firm? Would she
then have to work twice as hard to (re-)prove her collegiality and her
willingness to be a team player?
The next element of my good faith claim requires Christina to allege
that the firm took an adverse employment action against her and that
this action was caused by the unreasonable expectations imposed on her
due to her attached working identity. The nature of the claim, however,
compels me to rethink this element of the claim as I've thus articulated it.
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I would now reframe this element more broadly, not in terms of adverse
employment action, but in Hadfield's terms, that is, in terms of the
restraining of, in this case, women's choices because of sex-based
harassment and discrimination. Reframing the element in this way is
useful not only because it enables the good faith claim to encompass
harassment claims that would not otherwise be actionable under Title
VII. It is also useful as a theoretical and doctrinal matter because it gets
to the heart of the contractual nature of the good faith claim: the breach
of the good faith duty and of the contract itself occurs when economic
deprivation results from the harassing and/or discriminatory conduct.
We are perhaps used to thinking of such economic deprivation as, for
example, termination from employment or as a failure to promote, but,
as Hadfield has argued, such deprivation also occurs when the economic
and workplace choices of the non-breaching party become constrained
because of discriminatory conduct. This is precisely what has happened
to Christina. Her choices about whom she can work with - unlike the
choices of others at the firm - have become constrained because of
Dave's misconduct. And, depending on how Dave responds to her
decision, her choices may become further constrained if other partners
are not sympathetic to her situation.
The availability of my proposed good faith antidiscrimination claim
would enable someone like Christina, who would not be able to bring a
Title VII hostile environment claim because she arguably did not feel
sufficiently abused, or the harassment was not sufficiently "pervasive,"
to pursue a remedy for the economic harm she incurred because of the
harassment.
The claim is even more appealing because, being
contractual in nature, it could readily absorb Gillian Hadfield's
compelling arguments about the economic harm resulting from sexual
harassment and directly address those harms. Importantly, the claim
continues to incorporate the important theoretical insights of critical race
scholars and critical race feminists alike.
CONCLUSION

In this Essay, I have urged critical race feminists to more explicitly and
actively interrogate and deconstruct the longstanding dichotomy of
public and private law. Further, I have suggested that we do so by not
only continuing to critique private law areas such as, inter alia, property
law, contract law, and business law, but also by making positive
interventions in those areas of law with the goal of effecting both
theoretical and doctrinal change. This call to critical race feminists is no
doubt motivated by my own interest and work in contract law and,
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specifically, how the contractual doctrine of good faith and fair dealing
might be used to infuse the private law of contract with public and
critical race norms of equality.
To that end, I have outlined in this Essay a proposed common law
antidiscrimination claim rooted theoretically in both critical race and
contract theory, and in the contractual doctrine of good faith (rather than
in traditional civil rights jurisprudence). I have been working through
this project for quite some time, and this symposium has given me the
great opportunity to further theorize and develop my proposed claim so
that it takes into account and addresses some of the profoundly
important insights and critiques critical race feminists have been making
for the past twenty years. Thus, I have attempted to demonstrate in this
Essay how my proposed good faith antidiscrimination claim could be
used to address essentialist and intersectional critiques of employment
discrimination law and to demonstrate the continued relevance and
importance of these critiques.
Finally, I hope that in this Essay I have demonstrated how we might
think about how to bridge the chasm between theory and praxis in our
scholarly work, for critical scholars in the law have long been criticized
sl
for our failures in this regard. And while many of us are committed
and effective teacher-activists inside and outside of the classroom, we do
need to continue to suggest ways in which we might actualize our
scholarly critiques within our scholarly work, so that, again in the words
of Edward Said, we continue to "connect[] ... politically vigilant forms of
interpretation to an ongoing political and social praxis.,,82

81
For example, the Honorable Harry T. Edwards, of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, famously expressed his concerns over "the growing disjunction
between legal education and the legal profession." Harry T. Edwards, The Growing

Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992).
Judge Edwards criticized in particular what he then viewed as the increasingly theoretical
nature of legal scholarship in the fields, for example, of law and economics, law and
literature, critical legal studies, Critical Race Theory, and feminist legal theory. ld. passim.
He further questioned this scholarship's usefulness to practicing lawyers and to judges,
and cautioned that the unmediated and continued emphasis on such theoretical
scholarship in elite law schools would result in the desertion of a primary responsibility of
law schools to make and train lawyers. ld. passim.
82 Said, supra note 53, at 147.
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